Essay on Methods

In describing my research interests, I would first circumscribe them to the theoretical or conjectural realms. I would then specify that my core interest is metatheory, that is to say the investigation and analysis of theories, and the creation of theories about theories. The other major qualification of my research interests is, of course, that I am focused on religion and religious phenomena. I have chosen the field of religious studies because religion is, to me, the area where humans contemplate and address the most fundamental concerns about our existence, such as the meaning of life, the nature of ultimate reality, eschatological matters, etc. I am interested in religious phenomena insomuch as they seriously attempt to deal with these fundamental human concerns. Admittedly, not all religious phenomena are intended for such purposes, and so I consider it to be one of my principle tasks to select the appropriate religious phenomena to investigate in the first place.

I do also acknowledge that my interests, as I have just described them, will differ from those of other researchers within the field of religious studies, such as perhaps historians or anthropologists of religion. While historical and anthropological data will be fundamentally important to my research, I will not make it my business to collect, organize and synthesize such data. I will leave this task to others who are more passionately involved with such methodological procedures. But I will be highly attentive to these researchers and their findings, as the data produced will constitute the starting point for my own work. As I am preoccupied with the modern spiritual predicament (the intense popularity of the “New Atheists” and a recent survey showing that “nones” – people claiming to have no religion – is the fastest growing “religious” tradition in the United States (Gilgoff 2009) both appear to symptomize an ominous spiritual deficiency in today’s world), I will try to derive insights from specific findings that may be helpful in deciphering or uncovering humankind’s current spiritual status and direction. In the spirit of Michel Foucault’s genealogical approach to social science, I will consider it my duty to problematize certain existing assumptions about religion and religious phenomena in an attempt to clear the way for innovative thought.

Throughout the remainder of this essay, I will explore how the work of some of the classic theorists of religion such Weber and Eliade, the sociologist Durkheim, as well as the anthropologists Geertz and Evans-Pritchard, will inform my own methodological approach as I pursue the research interests and objectives described above. I will consider each of these theorists separately, starting with Eliade.  

Eliade contends, with his notion of the sacred, that there is something unique and special about the religious experience. For Eliade, “to try to grasp the essence of such a phenomenon by means of physiology, psychology, sociology, economics, linguistics, art, or any other is false” (Pals 2006, 197). For Eliade, all these approaches miss the point of the religious experience entirely – they ignore the element of “the sacred” at play in these phenomena. For Eliade, the sacred is “an intuitive burst of discovery” whereby “the religious imagination sees things otherwise ordinary and profane as more than themselves and turns them into the sacred” (Pals 2006, 205). The sacred is the feeling people get of being “gripped by a reality that is ‘wholly other’ than themselves – something mysterious, awesome, powerful, and beautiful” (Pals 2006, 199). Eliade’s notion of “the sacred” provides an important platform or baseline for my own approach to religious studies because it constitutes an acknowledgement of the unique character of religious experience. It is indeed fundamental to my approach to religion that people who engage in religious behavior are understood to be reaching out to something beyond themselves in the hope of grasping what little of it they can with their relatively limited human means. The sacred is a unique and special type of human intuition because it relates to a mysterious other reality that cannot be fully understood or rationalized. Although it will not be my goal to assess the substance or veracity of individual sacred experiences (or religious truth claims for that matter), my approach, much like Eliade’s, will always admit the possibility of humankind’s physical, emotional or intellectual contact with otherworldly forces or entities. With his notion of the sacred, Eliade is in a sense motioning towards something that might be real, ontologically speaking. Without presuming to know the source of the sacred, Eliade insists that, whatever the source is, it is unique, mysterious and powerful since the human experience associated with it is also unique, mysterious and powerful. Eliade is therefore suggesting that some (but certainly not all) religious people might be on to something, and that “something” should be properly understood as the object of our study. The methodological approach that I intend to use for my own work will also allow for the possibility that religious people might be on to something, as I do not find strictly reductionist conclusions all that convincing, or even reasonable, given the sheer complexity of the world as we know it. Eliade’s theory, then, will constitute one of the pillars of my methodological approach, if for no other reason than simply to provide the fertile ground in which ideas and theories pertaining to ultimate reality and the transcendent can grow freely, inhibited by scientific reductionism.

The sociological approach to religion, such as the one employed by Durkheim, is also relevant to my own research project. It is difficult to disassociate religion from society, so the study of society is an important perspective from which to consider religious phenomena. Profound theories of religion can emerge from sociological research, and to the extent these theories provide insight into the nature of religion itself, they constitute important objects of metatheoretical examination. Durkheim pioneered the sociological study of religion, and his work set the tone for later sociologists of religion. In The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, Durkheim describes society as the original breading ground of religious sentiment. For Durkheim, society in and of itself produces within its members certain types of feelings not accessible to isolated individuals living outside of society: “within a crowd moved by a common passion, we become susceptible to feelings and actions of which we are incapable on our own” (Durkheim 2001, 157). A social group is therefore to be understood as something greater than the sum of its individual members. Durkheim remarks how the joining of primitive individuals into social groups produces a degree of passion not otherwise observed within isolated individuals: “The very fact of assembling is an exceptionally powerful stimulant. Once the individuals are assembled, their proximity generates a kind of electricity that quickly transports them to an extraordinary degree of exaltation” (Durkheim 2001, 162). Furthermore, for Durkheim, this extraordinary reaction, this passion and electricity associated with social gatherings, is the source of the religious experience: “Therefore it is in these effervescent social settings, and from this very effervescence, that the religious idea seems to be born” (Durkheim 2001, 164). For Durkheim, the “totemic principle,” which is related to the inability of the primitive mind to grasp the complex reality of the clan, is the association of these feelings of vitality and effervescence with the totem: “It is therefore natural that the feelings the clan awakens in individual consciousness – feelings of dependence and increased vitality – are much more attached to the idea of the totem than to that of the clan” (Durkheim 2001, 165). The totemic principle is “the clan conceived in the physical form represented by the emblem” (Durkheim 2001, 167). For Durkheim, the effervescence produced by the social gathering is what constitutes religious feeling; furthermore, the totem as the embodiment of that social effervescence houses the concept of god: “Because religious force is nothing but the collective and anonymous force of the clan, and because this can be imagined only in the form of the totem, the totemic emblem is like the visible body of the god” (Durkheim 2001, 166).

Durkheim’s theory of religion effectively exposes some interesting dynamics between religion and society. I would concur with Daniel Pals who highlights the value of situating religion within the social context: “Who would wish to deny that for devout Catholics, a requiem mass, which on its face is a plea to God to save the souls of the dead from Hell, is, underneath that surface, also a powerful ritual of group solidarity and renewal?” (Pals 2006, 133) Sociology therefore provides an important input to the overall theoretical constitution of religion, but I would disagree with Durkheim when he writes in the above quotation that religion is “nothing but the collective and anonymous force of the clan…” In this sense, I diverge from Durkheim who, methodologically, substitutes theoretical possibilities pertaining to the transcendent with strictly sociological theories and explanations of religion. For Durkheim, “The feelings the physical world evokes in us cannot, by definition, contain anything that transcends this world.” For Durkheim, “nothing comes from nothing,” and “from the tangible we can make only the tangible; we cannot make something unlimited from something limited” (Durkheim 2001, 170). If we are to accept Durkheim’s theory that religion is constituted solely by the impulses produced by society, and the God is merely the totemic emblem of that same society, then we must agree with Durkheim that “nothing comes from nothing” and abandon the possibility of the transcendent. Into my own work I intend to incorporate sociological findings and theories to the extent they may generate useful and valuable insights into the study of religion, but I will make no such negative assumptions regarding the existence of the transcendent. In keeping with the spirit of anti-reductionism that I wish to associate with my work, I might entertain, for instance, the possibility of sociological phenomena as manifestations of the transcendent itself. In any case, I will base my own research on the assumption that sociological factors can likely only reveal part of the overall picture when it comes to understanding religion. The idea that sociological factors in and of themselves do not necessarily eliminate the possibility that there may be other forces at play will be fundamental to my work.

The anthropological approach to religion, much like the sociological approach, constitutes another important data element when it comes to constructing theories of religion. Strictly descriptive anthropological accounts of religious or other human phenomena, such as Evans-Pritchard’s work on cattle in The Nuer, can be used as the raw material for subsequent theoretical construction. Other anthropological approaches, such as the one employed by Clifford Geertz, which go beyond simple description and provide insight into some of the deeper meanings associated with the observed phenomena (i.e. “thick descriptions”) can be helpful as well in this regard. For Geertz, culture is “’a pattern of meanings,’ or ideas, carried in symbols, by which people pass along their knowledge of life and express their attitudes toward it” (Pals 2006, 270). For Geertz, an analysis of culture therefore cannot be “‘an experimental science in search of a law but an interpretive one in search of meaning’” (Pals 2006, 269). Whether it be Evans-Pritchard’s raw data or Geertz’ patterns of meanings, the anthropological approach is relevant to my own research work insomuch as it leads, one way or another, to profound insights into certain aspects of religious phenomena. As such, it provides substance for further theoretical and metatheoretical consideration with respect to religion.

Methodologically speaking however, my research work will probably have more in common with Weber than with Durkheim or the anthropologists discussed above. Weber attributes to religion a formative power unlike any other, and his work more definitely seeks to prove how religion is the first cause of other observable human phenomena. Daniel Pals qualifies Weber’s approach in the following manner: “Human ideas, beliefs, and motives deserve to be counted as real and independent causes of human action” (Pals 2006, 183), and “meanings matter; the webs of significance that human beings spin do effectively shape and change the material and social structures that lie beneath” (Pals 2006, 184). A fundamental aspect of Weber’s approach is therefore the importance he gives to religion as an influential force affecting the minds of individual people, and its resulting ability to shape society. For Weber, much of human thought, whether it be from the individual or group perspective, is informed by religious belief. Hence, Weber grants to religion a molding power that it lacks in the theories of Durkheim and other reductionists such as Marx and Freud, who “assume that religious actions and beliefs always trace to non-religious causes, whether psychological, social, or socioeconomic” (Pals 2006, 183). Durkheim, in a sense, was a sociologist with an opinion on religion. On the basis of his work, one might say it never occurred to Durkheim that religion might be the root cause of anything. Weber’s approach to religion is not reductionist in the way that Durkheim’s is. For Weber, religious beliefs are so fundamental to the human intellectual makeup that they can seen as the source, rather than the product, of the more mundane aspects of human existence. For instance, Weber attributes the rise of Western capitalism to the arrival of specifically Protestant religious ideas and behaviors in the seventeenth century.[1]  Here, it is interesting to consider Weber’s starting point. As Pals explains, Weber began his investigation in The Protestant Ethic by asking: “How did a new and revolutionary form of economic behavior arise to transform Western civilization in the early centuries of the modern era?” (Pals 2006, 182) It is methodologically significant that Weber should begin his analysis with the idea that something more fundamental, more profound, was at the source of more outward economic behavior. In a sense, Weber “sets up” religion as a potential root cause of revolutionary human behavior, then proceeds to argue that indeed it is. As such, Weber’s approach implicitly assigns an immediacy and a relevance to religion not acknowledged by Durkheim and other reductionists.

In my view, scholars of religion should be driven by the desire to demonstrate, scientifically or otherwise, how religion might explain certain things about the world. If, as scholars of religion, we do not employ this stance as our starting point, then the logic of our enterprise will be fundamentally flawed. Our starting hypothesis will contradict the very object of our study. Can we really pretend to be furthering the study of religion if our analysis is intended to prove the secondary nature of religious phenomena? And should we inadvertently succeed in this attempt to discredit religion as a fundamental driver of various other human phenomena, what will we be left with to study? In my own research work, I intend to follow Weber’s example: I will try to identify ways in which religion, as a unique and distinct phenomenon, impacts human life. I will at least begin my work with the hypothesis that the fundamental object of religious phenomena (ultimate reality, the transcendent, etc.) may have a certain ontological status. In summary, an orientation towards open possibilities as opposed to limited functionalist interpretations will characterize my work generally.  

Works Cited 

Durkheim, Émile. The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. London: Oxford University Press, 2001.

Gilgoff, Dan. “New Survey: Those With No Religion Fastest-Growing Tradition.” U.S. News & World Report. March 9, 2009. (accessed February 24, 2010).

Pals, Daniel L. Eight Theories of Religion. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.

[1] See The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism by Max Weber, published in 1958.


One thought on “Essay on Methods”

  1. when it comes to religous experiance since there is always a required action in response to the sacred the aspects on behavior would always suggest the behavior to be more on the unacceptable side of society.
    yet also even more unacceptable is when one knows they are a subject and of course act anyway those who set up these models stay quiet as if they know nothing of the model. I mean really the decor was not set up without knowledge of the objects placed together does not the subject have a right to know for the sake of even judging the objects according to their use and simply the whole picture so to speak. Help me out here

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