Religious Studies & Metaphysics

In “The ‘academic naturalization’ of Religious Studies: Intent or pretense?”, Donald Wiebe categorically reminds us that the academic study of religion “achieved academic status as a legitimate scholarly undertaking, housed in its own political structure within the academic and university community, precisely on the basis of a clear demarcation between itself and theology” (Wiebe, 198). For Wiebe however, the study of religion has failed to “restrict its cognitive concerns (…) to the drawing of empirical generalizations about particular religious traditions and about Religion in general, and the formulation of testable hypotheses to account for such generalizations” (Wiebe, 198-199). For Wiebe then, there is no room for metaphysical considerations within the study of religion if such a study is to be considered by any means scientific. A hypothesis that cannot be empirically tested is, for Wiebe, not a hypothesis that is appropriate for consideration within religious studies. But despite Wiebe’s objections, metaphysics have infiltrated the academic study of religion, a fact that, for Wiebe, amounts to a “failure of nerve” within the discipline. As a result, in Wiebe’s view the academic study of religion pretends to be what it is not, and in the process blocks the intention of its original founders (Wiebe, 199).

But for Charles Davis, Wiebe’s position is problematic, since the reductionist skepticism which seems to characterize Wiebe’s approach is, after all, not as cognitively neutral as Wiebe might like to think. In “The immanence of knowledge and the ecstacy of faith,” Charles Davis views the scientific neutrality of the sort aspired to by Wiebe as a “self-deceptive illusion” (Davis, 193), since a genuine neutrality should “prescind from both religious faith and reductionist skepticism” (Davis, 193). For Davis, “knowing is always an affair of a concrete knowing subject, with a particular history, a particular formation, a particular accumulation of experience, a particular habitual knowledge, a particular set of biases” (Davis, 193). For Davis, the impressionable nature of the knowing subject is such that there can in fact be no discernible cognitive neutral zone to house the scientist or the empiricist anywhere between the two extremes of religious faith and reductionist skepticism – implicit in all possible approaches to the study of religion is a specific philosophical stance with respect to religious transcendence. Wiebe’s reductionist skepticism can therefore be viewed as an expression of a particular knowing subject’s disbelief in the ontological validity of religious transcendence.

Wiebe calls for the straight-forward demarcation of religious studies from theology, but in so doing Wiebe fails to consider the evolving nature of theology itself. For Davis, post-Enlightenment theology is still relevant to religious studies insomuch as it has grown out of its earlier foundation on authority. For Davis, “to take one’s stand with the Enlightenment upon reason, not authority, is the regard reason alone as competent to make truth-claims. Authority may establish a context for social collaboration and thus create a tradition. What it cannot do for post-Enlightenment scientific people is to impose belief as true and demand assent” (Davis, 192). For Davis then, the Enlightenment caused a tectonic cognitive shift from authority to reason, a shift so intense and profound that it diminished or altogether eliminated the previously known authoritative power of theology in favor of the illuminating strength of reason. For Davis, to the extent that theology since the Enlightenment has become reasonable, it now constitutes a legitimate philosophic discipline deserving serious consideration within the field of religious studies. As Davis points out, “there is no discernible difference between theology and philosophy of religion,” a discipline that emerged historically “when revealed theology as invoking an authority higher than reason was no longer a viable option to those accepting the Enlightenment autonomy of reason” (Davis, 192). For Davis, modern theology or the philosophy of religion no longer constitute the same kind theology that Wiebe disqualifies as scientifically inept.

While Davis effectively argues for the reconvergence of theology and religious studies, his credibility is somewhat compromised by his unfortunate insistence on the need for the observer of religion to be somehow religiously committed in order to be able to properly fulfill his/her scholarly duties. In Davis’ opinion “we should hardly expect a person closed to religious faith to be a sensitive interpreter of religious data” (Davis, 195). While Davis’ point as it relates to the sensitivity of the observer in matters religious is well taken, by insisting as he does on this particular point he feeds the skepticism of his opponents, and needlessly upsets the delicate balance of his carefully crafted argument. After all, the skeptics will say, if reason is a universal trait that is accessible to everybody, how then are some better positioned than others to deploy its power within the field of religious studies?


4 thoughts on “Religious Studies & Metaphysics”

  1. To bad Davis forgets that empiricism has lead us to have predictive power over the universe (planetary motion, black holes and quantum tunneling to name a few). Thus while one can’t mathematically prove empiricism is right the fact that I can write this which requires trillions of electrons to strictly obey the laws of electrodynamics is stronger evidence that knowledge from rational skepticism is correct compared with thousands of years of “religious knowledge” which only gave wars, lack of democratic institutions and a 20% survival rate of children (the art would be produced anyways since art started before religion).

    Thus I can’t see how anyone would take his argument seriously (except for personal bias) as it has no predictive power.

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